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REFLECTIONS ON SELF-DETERMINATION 
William Burnett Harvey* 
SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION. By Lee C. 
Buchheit. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 260. 
$17.50. 
Today, limited resources, intersecting trade flows, and expo-
sure to the foibles of the great (and less-than-great) powers, 
among other causes, produce a human condition that communi-
cations technology brings home to all of us. Claims that are more 
and more powerful and insistent are asserted, simultaneously, on 
behalf of the individual, the group, and the nation, each stressing 
the claimants' distinctiveness. Respect for selfhood may w.ell be 
essential to individual, group, and national health and well-
being. Clearly, however, self-awareness and self-assertion also 
emphasize differences from other selves; to prevent the dissimilar 
from causing abrasions and conflict, open space may be needed 
that an increasingly ·crowded world does not easily provide. 
Daily the news media illustrate at the national level such 
drives and the dangers they create: Quebec separatists win con-
trol of the provincial government and demand basic changes in 
the Canadian federation; Shaba is invaded by forces opposed to 
the distant and "alien" government of Zaire; Britain seeks to 
mollify Scottish nationalism by the delegation of greater regional 
autonomy. Whether expressed in calm parliamentary debate, in 
strident oratory, or with a rifle in a guerilla's hands, the strong 
assertions that "we are different," that "it is humiliating to be 
ruled by strangers," and that "we are entitled to govern ourselves 
and define our own destiny," strike deep responsive chords in 
individual, group, and national experience throughout the world. 
Simultaneously they can and often do arouse deep-seated fears 
of social and political fragmentation. 
For better than half a century at least, the separatists' claim 
has invoked the "right to self-determination." To a substantial 
literature on the subject, Lee C. Buchheit has added a thoughtful 
small book that probes the inherent ambiguities of the asserted 
right, seeks its philosophical underpinnings and its claim to vali-
dation by positive international law, state practice, or juristic 
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op1mon, and finally proposes a set of standards by which the 
legitimacy of a claim to self-determination might, in his view, be 
assessed. 
Aside from the radical anarchist whose right to self-
determination-as he asserts it-is highly self-centered, most 
who claim the right have a group in view. By reference to what 
determinants of shared identity is the group "self' entitled to 
determine its political status, to be located on the linear progres-
sion from the minimal gathering to vast aggregations? In devel-
oped modern societies most individuals are associated with 
groups in diverse ways-Democrats, professors, union members 
-and each association implies a certain distinctive attribute. 
Buchheit sensibly rejects such perceptions of distinct identity 
as a basis for asserting a right to self-determination, finding 
more plausible "relatively objective, verifiable criteria" such as 
religion, history, geography, language, race, and economic activ-
ity. He acknowledges, however, the current lack of consensus on 
any set of conditions as either necessary or sufficient to define the 
self and thereby earn the right of determination. Nor does the 
development of such a consensus seem likely. Buchheit quotes Sir 
Ivor Jennings' trenchant remark: "On the surface it seemed rea-
sonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because 
the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the 
people." As with the devotees of Savigny's older romanticism, so 
with those like Buchheit who would raise the cry of self-
determination from the level of political rhetoric to the status of 
a norm of international law: uncertainty as to the structural con-
cept of "Volk" or "self' is fundamental and embarrassing. 
The murkiness of self-determination raises troublesome 
problems at every level of political life and action, but Buchheit 
narrows the focus to secession from established states. While a 
limited number of "legal" arguments can be marshalled against 
recognition of a right to secede (e.g., pacta sunt servanda), it 
seems clear that the principal resistance to such recognition does 
not rest on law, but on fears of the consequences of undermining 
the present units of a precarious international order: conse-
quences implicit in fragmentation into more numerous weak 
states which have neither political nor economic viability. 
Basically sympathetic to some claims of a right to secede, 
Buchheit presses a balanced-and ultimately, I think, unsuccess-
ful-search for a basis for validating that right: in philosophic or 
jurisprudential thought, positive international law, state prac-
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tice, and juristic opinion. If secession has a philosophical home, 
it lies in the natural law tradition. Yet classic natural law lacked 
a mediating structure between the individual and the state. 
Grounding a right to secede on aggregated individual rights to 
resist oppression interposes no barriers to the ultimate fragmen-
tation-"infinite divisibility"-of the structure of public order. 
Before the creation of the United Nations, positive interna-
tional law lent little if any support to a claimed right of secession. 
The impetus that right received from Wilsonian idealism was 
rapidly dissipated by the realistic recognition that self-
determination could not plausibly be limited to those areas where 
military defeat provided opportunities for territorial adjust-
ments. With Wilson unable to marshal the support even of his 
own advisors, the post-war treaties were silent on self-
determination. Concern for it survived only in a pattern of treaty 
provisions aimed at the protection of minority rights in multi-
ethnic states. 
With the creation of the United Nations and the beginning 
of the dynamic of decolonization, self-determination again be-
came prominent in international discussion. The United Nations 
Charter contains two references, in articles 1(2) and 55, to the 
"self-determination of peoplJs." Subsequently, the Assembly's 
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (both adopted by the General Assem-
bly in 1966), and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations ar-
ticulated a principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, pro-
foundly difficult problems remain in ascertaining the parameters 
of any resulting norm that validates the right to self-
determination, particularly if expressed in secession from an es-
tablished state. In this regard classic decolonization must surely 
be treated as a special case. The insistent demands of dependent 
peoples, the imperial fatigue of the European colonial powers, 
and the opportunism of the Socialist bloc combined to produce 
an early consensus, buttressed by state practice keyed to percep-
tions of national interest, that the peoples of the colonial territo-
ries were entitled to throw off their foreign yokes and determine 
their political status in the international community. It may well 
be, however, tQ.at self-determination as a norm of positive inter-
national law largely spent its force in dealing with the classic form 
of colonialism. Certainly one should discount the broad language 
of some United Nations pronouncements that appear in declara-
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tions specifically addressed to colonialism, especially if one takes 
note that the nations created by its demise seem to be entirely 
unreceptive to the right in their area. The Organization of African 
Unity, for example, has made respect for territorial integrity a 
cardinal principle, despite the fact that each state's territory in-
cludes diverse peoples-distinguishable often by language, cul-
ture, religion, and other factors that might plausibly define a 
distinct "self'-some of whom could advance, and indeed have 
asserted, a right to self-determination. 
Controversy over an asserted riglit to self-determination is 
rarely limited to the parent state and the people seeking to 
secede. The separatists may seek outside help-moral and mate-
rial-and affirmative responses from other states may rest on 
principle, interest, or both. And the parent state itself may re-
quest assistance in suppressing rebellion and separation. This 
radiating influence of a separatist effort further complicates any 
effort to appraise the proposal by the United Nations of a broadly 
stated right to self-determination. The Charter itself does not 
speak unequivocally, but antinomically: if self-determination is 
a basic principle, so also are nonintervention in the internal af-
fairs of sister states and proscription of the use of force. But surely 
assistance to either a parent state in putting down a secession or 
to the secessionists in furthering it will involve intervention that 
frequently calls for force. 
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the tension be-
tween norms appears in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions. Though early paragraphs state broadly the principle of self-
determination, including specifically the "right to secession," 
paragraphs 7 and 8 reassert the norm of nonintervention and the 
values of territorial integrity and of the political unity of sover-
eign states. Perhaps these divergent norms and values can be 
reconciled by conceding a limited license to intervene in aid of a 
secessionist effort if the parent state in its internal administration 
has infringed "the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples." If immunity from intervention must 
be earned by showing consent of the governed, then relatively few 
states in the contemporary world could successfully claim it and 
resist the demands for self-determination, even if those demands 
caused disintegration and risked provoking violent intervention. 
It appears likely that few states would welcome a realistic scru-
tiny of such a basis for their claim to nonintervention and terri-
torial integrity. 
State practice, much more than the lofty rhetoric of United 
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Nations debate and declarations, reveals the actual status of the 
right to self-determination and specifically of the right to secede. 
National rhetoric may obscure reality, however. For example, the 
Constitution of the U. S. S. R. explicitly provides for the reserva-
tion of "the right freely to secede from the U. S. S. R. ... to 
every Union Republic." Soviet spokesmen, citing this commit-
ment, probably have realized significant propaganda gains when 
United Nations discussions have turned to Third World claims to 
separation from their Western colonial masters. The gap between 
Soviet rhetoric and Soviet reality is starkly revealed, however, 
when attention is given to the treatment accorded separatist sen-
timent and action in the Ukraine and Georgia and to the brutal 
interventions by Soviet forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
The Chinese have not behaved differently except, recently, to 
show greater candor. While the Chinese Communist leaders in 
1931 made a "constitutional" commitment to self-determination 
and the right of each national minority in China to secede and 
form its own independent state, the 1975 Constitution bluntly 
asserts that the "People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-
national State. The areas where regional national autonomy is 
exercised are all inalienable parts of the People's Republic of, 
China." As noted earlier, the new states of Africa have accorded 
primary value to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states 
despite, or perhaps because of, the ethnic diversity and centrifu-
gal forces within each of the nations defined by European coloni-
alism. In the United States, despite our revolutionary ancestry 
and early recognition that the time may come "for one people to 
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with an-
other, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate 
and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's 
God entitle them," we fought a civil war to establish that there 
was no right to secede; nor have we accorded to peoples in other 
parts of the world the entitlement we once. claimed for ourselves. 
Where we have instigated a foreign secession (Panama), pledged 
"respect [to] the right of all people to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live" (Atlantic Charter), or castigated 
our Communist adversaries for denying self-determination to the 
peoples of the Eastern Bloc satellite nations, we have been guided 
by national self-interest rather than by a norm of the interna-
tional community. 
It is surely not surprising that established states should be 
reluctant to open the floodgates of. self-determination, thereby 
spilling its acid over their own cohesion and even more widely 
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over the other national units on which a precarious international 
order is grounded. In view of the hazards of fragmentation and 
the deep-seated fears these hazards engender, it is perhaps sur-
prising that the international community has been recurrently 
willing to articulate a principle of self-determination, however 
unclear its scope, and has not labelled all secessions unworthy of 
support. Something might be gained, therefore, by formulating 
more precisely the criteria of a legitimate secession, so that out-
side supporters could be praised, not condemned, for their inter-
vention and so that the parent state would have no principled 
basis for asking assistance in suppressing the secession. Possibly 
also, a state's anticipation of isolation in dealing with its sepa-
ratists could stimulate its respect for its minorities, their culture, 
and their claims to full civic participation. 
Buchheit concludes by attempting to define and explicate 
the criteria of legitimacy. Adopting a utilitarian perspective with 
an avowedly conservative bent (that is, favoring the protection of 
existing states), Buchheit proposes to test the legitimacy of seces-
sionist demands by inquiring whether meeting them would in-
crease "the general 'amount' of world harmony." To convert that 
general-and fatally vague-test into a usable framework for 
discussion and decision, he suggests that two basic factors, each 
reflecting the interplay of a number of variables, be considered: 
the internal merits of the secessionists' claim and the net increaS'e 
in the disruption of the international community that would re-
sult from supporting or acquiescing in the claim. 
The internal merits of the claim would depend on the distinc-
tiveness of the claimant group; its "selfhood" in terms of cultural, 
racial, or historical factors; its occupancy of a distinct territory; 
and its viability as a continuing, coherent, independent com-
munity. Assessment of the disruption factor would involve bal-
ancing (a) the disruption currently existing as a result of unful-
filled aspirations for separation from the parent state and (b) the 
disruption that would flow from their fulfillment. Only a signifi-
cant net increase in disruption would allow the calculator to as-
sess the disruption factor as high. This leads to the curious result 
that if the present lot of separatists is disruptive, perhaps because 
of violent agitation or either the threat or actuality of third-party 
interventions, and if the prospect of the secession's success would 
seriously disquiet or upset the international balance, the disrup-
tion factor would nevertheless be calculated as "low." This termi-
nological oddity• can be ignored if one keeps in mind that the 
calculus is aimed at the net increase of disruption. Disruption 
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itself is a multi-faceted concept, involving the effects of both 
continued unity and separation on the parent state itself, on other 
states closely concerned, and on the general international order 
with respect to humanitarian, economic, military, and structural 
concerns. 
Buchheit illustrates the operation of his analytical frame-
work by considering the successful secession of East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh). Despite the area's rather poor prospects for future 
economic viability, the distinctiveness of the Bengali majority 
would have brought a fairly high rating of the internal merits of 
the secessionist claim. On the other hand, the explosive situation 
created by secessionist agitation, its brutal suppression by the 
Western-controlled Pakistani army, and the dangers implicit in 
possible Indian intervention meant that secession and indepen-
dence would change the form but not greatly increase the scale 
of disruption. In any event, whether influenced by these calcula-
tions or by other factors, the international community readily 
accorded legitimacy to the Bangladesh secession. 
A test case for Buchheit's decisional model that is in some 
ways more significant than Bangladesh, since it is still topical in 
the international community, is Transkei, the first African 
"homeland" to be granted independence by South Africa. Follow-
ing an extended constitutional evolution, the South African Par-
liament in 1976 granted full legislative competence to the Tran-
skei legislative assembly, which then enacted its own constitu-
tion, asserted its sovereign independence, and sought recognition 
as a new member of the community of nations. Transkei's inter-
national reception has been chilly indeed: only South Africa has 
recognized Transkeian independence; its legitimacy has been 
denied by the United Nations, which branded its independence 
a "sham" and its government a "puppet." Clearly the Transkeian 
secession has been deemed illegitimate for an immediately ob-
vious reason: it is regarded as functional, perhaps essential, to the 
odious South African policy of apartheid. If the Buchheit model 
had structured the international reaction to Transkei, would the 
result have been different? My answer can be only impressionis-
tic, since hard data on some of the relevant variables are not 
available. 
Though Transkeian territory comprises three separate par-
cels aggregating about 14,887 square miles, the largest, bounded 
on the east by the South Indian Ocean, is the traditional home-
land of a number of groups speaking dialects of the Xhosa lan-
guage. While subgroup identities and loyalties probably exist 
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among the Xhosa speakers, their language and other cultural 
factors provide a common group identity for about ninety-four 
percent of the total population. The remainder are primarily 
Zulu-Sotho people, with a miniscule representation of whites, 
Asians, and persons of mixed descent. Since the majority's self-
identity rests on ethnicity rather than on such transitory factors 
as resistance to an external oppressor, group cohesion is likely to 
continue and, with it, the at least potential capacity for an inde-
pendent existence in the political sense. If such capacity has an 
economic dimension, any assessment of prospects after secession 
becomes much more doubtful. I know of no reliable resource in-
ventory for Transkei. If it has minerals or oil, they are unknown. 
The present economy depends almost entirely on subsistence 
farming, the earnings of migrant workers in the Republic of South 
Africa, and subsidies from the South African government. De-
spite the negative factors of economic uncertainty and a possibly 
vulnerable "trapped minority," the majority's strong ethnic 
identity, particularly as counterposed to the alien and oppressive 
parent state, leads to a fairly high assessment of the "internal 
merits" of Transkei's claim to self-determination. 
The Buchheit calculus presents its greatest difficulties when 
we turn to the disruption factor. As a starting point, it seems clear 
that agitation for Transkeian secession in no way disrupted inter-
national harmony: There was no significant terrorist activity; no 
troublesome interventions were imminent; and parent-state op-
pression embraced all of the nonwhite population, not merely 
Transkeian secessionists. Indeed, secession as timed and planned 
was welcomed by the South African government. If the effects of 
actual secession are to be called seriously or even moderately 
disruptive, the net increase in disruption would have to be as-
sessed as high, when measured against such a low base line. 
What would these effects be? The loss of territory would 
exact no prohibitive costs, economic or military, from South Af-
rica. No resource base would be depleted, no trading patterns 
disturbed, no new military dangers or defense needs created. 
While the birth of a mini-state might be thought disquieting to 
the international order itself, the net loss of structural coherence 
resulting from the addition of one more tiny polity would be mini-
mal. With respect to such diminutive progeny, the world com-
munity already resembled the Old Woman Who Lived in a Shoe. 
International concern might be traced to doubt that the new state 
would respect human rights and other basic norms of behavior, 
but Transkei's anticipated conduct should not have contrasted 
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unfavorably with the historic conduct of South Africa. In one 
respect, of course, the Transkeian secession might be thought 
disruptive of international harmony: It led to a spate of furious 
rhetoric and self-righteous resolutions in the United Nations, but 
that was hardly new. That rhetoric had long been directed at 
South Africa because of its apartheid policy. Finally, threats to 
peace through armed intervention do not seem to have been in-
creased by the Transkeian spin-off. Such threats, however re-
mote, have lorig been suggested as an ultimate possibility if South 
African racial policy is not changed. 
On the calculus thus far developed it may appear in the case 
of Transkei that a claim to self-determination whose internal 
merits are fairly high should be balanced against a relatively low 
net disruption factor, so that the Transkeian claim ·to self-
determination through secession should have been deemed legiti-
mate. It would be plausible to argue that legitimacy as defined 
by a recognized international norm should obligate other nations 
to recognize Transkei's independence, accept it into the family of 
nations-, and accord it the usual benefits of friendly relations. 
Perhaps, however, the calculus presented is too simplistic. In 
his own discussion of the disruption factor, Buchheit suggests 
that the promotion of general international harmony involves 
more than the elimination or reduction of strife, that it involves 
"the goal of fostering conditions conducive to social development 
and the protection of human dignity." Such a goal is clearly 
relevant to the legitimate concern underlying United Nations 
hostility toward Transkei and the virtually unanimous denial of 
recognition of its independence: a fear that the Transkeian seces-
sion, followed by similar actions by Bophuthatswana and other 
homelands, would merely protect and strengthen apartheid, with 
all its dehumanizing implications and consequences. 
From this perspective one may raise the ultimate issue of 
ends and means: if international concerns and supportive norms 
properly embrace internal "conditions conducive to social devel-
opment and the protection of human dignity,"_ do the denial of 
legitimacy to Transkei's secession and the withholding ofrecogni-
tion and normal intercourse best lead to these conditions? The 
present international policy maximizes the chances. that Transkei 
will remain totally in the dark shadow of South Africa, that its 
political and cultural influence will remain undiluted, and that 
the material well-being•and freedom of the people of Transkei will 
depend almost entirely on the goodwill or self-interest of South 
Africa. In short, the denial of Transkeian independence becomes 
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a self-fulfilling prophecy. One must recognize, of course, that the 
price of human freedom and dignity is often high. If denial of the 
right of self-determination to the people of Transkei were a price 
that must be paid in order to subvert apartheid and open the 
gates of South Africa to racial justice and freedom, that price 
might be reasonable indeed. But can one say with any assurance 
that the price buys more than another expression of the wide-
spread and intense outrage over South African racial policy? 
The Transkei case illustrates both the virtues and the inade-
quacies of Buchheit's model for testing the legitimacy of seces-
sion. Like its remote ancestor, the Benthamite hedonistic calcu-
lus, it has a beguiling appearance of objectivity that quickly dis-
appears as one recognizes the dependence of the calculus on the 
weighing and measuring of such intangibles as individual and 
group perceptions, human aspirations and suffering, and any po-
tential for disruption. Buchheit expressly recognizes this problem 
but cannot resist the temptation to present the model in a two-
axis graph, one axis scaled "poor" to "excellent," the other "low" 
to "high." If the vectoring of variables to define positions on each 
axis depends on judgment, not quantification, the critical prob-
lem becomes the identity of the judge, the calculator. Majority 
votes in the General Assembly or even in the Security Council 
provide no assurance that those votes rest on even a democratized 
application of the calculus Buchheit proposes. Rather, the pivotal 
datum seems to be national interest assessed by each state before 
it casts its vote. Only nationalistic imperatives offer a plausible 
basis for understanding and explaining the shifting positions of 
individual states and international agencies on secessions thus far 
attempted: for example, Soviet support for East Pakistan but 
condemnation of Biafra; passionate espousal by the African 
states of anti-colonial self-determination but rejection of func-
tionally similar efforts by the Katangese and the Somalis; Ameri-
can laments over eastern Europe but support of Pakistan's effort 
to retain Bangladesh and of Zaire's suppression of the Shaba 
insurgency. Short of a radical restructuring of the international 
order-in both the articulation of norms and the allocation of 
power-there is surely not much reason to believe that Buchheit's 
legitimacy calculus will induce each nation to discard from its 
own calculations those perceptions of its national interest that 
influence its judgment in innumerable ways. 
Buchheit's decisional model is nevertheless a useful attempt 
to clarify thought on the factors that might be adduced in support 
of the legitimacy of secessionist self-determination. An interna-
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tional consensus on what those factors are could advise the par-
ties immediately involved as well as sharpen and elevate discus-
sion when political separation-independence-is desired or 
demanded. Such gains might be realized short of the develop-
ment of a norm specifying the respective weights of various fac-
tors or of institutions empowered to apply it. As in many less-
developed ("primitive") legal orders, norms can contribute to 
conflict resolution even in the absence of any expectation that a 
particular norm will be directly enforced. The norm still provides 
useful reference points for argument and a framework for the 
community's appraisal and decision. No winner or loser may 
emerge, but a "give-a-little, get-a-little" adjustment aimed at 
reconciliation of the disputants and the viability of an <:mgoing 
community might. For the international community, such a de-
velopment in its processes of decision and the objective those 
processes seek would be a distinct gain. 
